This paper uses data collected from eBay's website to identify why buyers fail to leave (negative) feedback in online markets. Empirical results confirm that the fear of retaliation may be an important motivation for buyers not to leave (negative) feedback, while the time and effort cost of reporting may be not.
Introduction
Reputation systems rely on voluntary feedback from traders to reduce information asymmetry and sustain trust, especially in online markets. Understanding participants' feedback behaviors helps improve reputation systems and sheds light on a broad range of observed behaviors (e.g., teaching evaluations, recommendation letters, and referee reports.)
Several authors find that buyers on eBay leave feedback about half the time. Moreover, in eBay's bi-lateral feedback system where both buyers and sellers can leave feedback after transactions, negative feedback is less frequent than positive feedback . Dellarocas and Wood (Forthcoming) and Klein et al. (2005) suggest fear of retaliation against the buyer who leave negative feedback may be a reason for missing negative feedback. Thus, buyers' concern about their own reputations keep them silent even if they are willing to spend time and effort on reporting their poorly performing counter parties. Another explanation of the lack of feedback may be the time/effort nuisance cost: feedback is a public good (not previously tested empirically.) For example, the participation rate in teaching evaluations drops after changing from in-class paper evaluations to online.
In experimental economics, Fehr and Gchter (2000) and Nikiforakisy (2007) find that people are willing to bear costs to punish deviators, but are less likely to punish when counter-punishment is possible. If buyers' feedback-leaving behaviors are consistent with the lab findings, we will see that buyers are willing to bear the nuisance cost of leaving negative feedback (i.e., cost to punish deviators), but are less likely to leave negative feedback when facing retaliation from strategic sellers (i.e., counter punishment.) First, by examining both nuisance cost and fear of retaliation concerns in bi-lateral systems, this paper adds to previous research by directly addressing the question of why people do not leave feedback. Second, instead of using a lab experiment, I compile a unique data set using eBay's 2003 policy change to identify whether nuisance cost is a consideration for buyers' decision to leave feedback. The empirical results suggest that although fear of retaliations may be an important motivation for buyers' reluctance to leave feedback, time and effort costs of reporting may be not important. Thus, further research on reducing nuisance costs may be a less fruitful approach to improving feedback mechanism design. These findings are relatively consistent with punishment and counter-punishment behavior in lab experiments.
Data
The data set contains information on 6609 successful eBay transactions for the iPod Nano 
Analytical Framework
To identify whether nuisance costs and fears of retaliation are reasons for buyers not to report, we test:
(1) Are buyers more likely to remain silent if sellers do not report first?
(2) Are inexperienced buyers more likely to remain silent than experienced buyers? (3) If sellers do not report first, are buyers more likely to be silent when receiving low quality products/services versus high quality ones? (4) Are inexperienced buyers more likely to remain silent than experienced buyers when receiving low quality products/service versus high quality ones?
To capture unobserved binary transaction outcomes, I build an empirical model that captures the sequence of events: transaction outcomes are selected by sellers first, then buyers choose whether to leave feedback. I use maximum likelihood method to simultaneously estimate the two equations in the model. The following binary choice model represents a buyer's decision to leave feedback:
where the latent variable, Y * i , represents a buyer's indirect utility from remaining silent. It is estimated by:
where X 1i is a vector of buyer characteristics and auction information, including age on eBay, The latent value of the true binary transaction outcome index, X 2i , is estimated from seller characteristics:
where the latent value of X 2i is estimated by the following equation:
Z i is a vector of a constant along with characteristics of the seller, including age and historical feedback profile.
I estimate the coefficients using maximum likelihood method with the likelihood function
where
The marginal probability for a buyer to remain silent is the product of the probability "to report" conditional on the transaction outcome and the probability of the transaction outcome. Then, we calculate the conditional probability given the transaction outcome is LQ or HQ. When the transaction outcome is LQ,
and when the transaction outcome is HQ,
I assume the error terms, i and η i , are independent and follow logistic distributions with
).
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Thus,
and
Thus, the marginal probability for a buyer to report equals
I substitute (10) into (3) and estimate all parameters. Using this empirical model, even though we do not observe the actual transactions qualities, we are still able to estimate the 4 I make this assumption since we cannot observe actual transaction qualities.
parameters of interests. Finally,β 4 =δ 1 −β 3 is (an inexperienced buyer's propensity to be silent − an experienced buyer's|HQ)
−(an inexperienced buyer's propensity to be silent − an experienced buyer's |LQ),
andβ 6 =δ 2 −β 5 is (a buyer's propensity to be silent when the seller does not report first −his propensity to be silent when the seller reports first|HQ)
−(a buyer's propensity to be silent when the seller does not report first −his propensity to be silent when the seller reports first|LQ).
Results
The results in Table 1 showβ 3 is positive at the 1% level: inexperienced buyers are more likely to keep silent than experienced buyers when transaction outcomes are LQ.β 4 is negative but insignificant.β 5 is positive and significant at the 10% level: buyers are more likely to remain silent when sellers do not report first. The effect on buyers' propensity to remain silent when sellers report first is lower for HQ transactions than LQ ones, sinceβ 6 is negative at the 1% level.
Thus, the extra time and effort needed to leave negative feedback may be a concern for inexperienced buyers reporting when the transaction outcomes are LQ. However, inexperienced buyers may be more likely to keep silent than experienced buyers when the transaction outcome is HQ. The difference-in-difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, the nuisance cost may not be a motivation for buyers failing to leave feedback. Moreover, when sellers do not reports first, buyers are more likely to remain silent. The difference in buyers'
propensity to remain silent, given that sellers do not report, are higher when the outcome is HQ. This suggests that fear of retaliation discourages buyers reporting to a greater degree when transaction outcomes are LQ than when transaction outcomes are HQ.
Conclusion
These findings on feedback behavior suggest that fears of retaliation may be a concern for
buyers. This provides empirical support for eBay's May 2008 policy change to ban sellers leaving negative feedback for buyers. This paper demonstrates that at least eBay's attempt to solve the fear of retaliation problem in the feedback system is a step in the right direction (although the policy implication needs more detailed investigation.) More importantly, we also show that nuisance costs may not be important. Both findings from real-world evidence are consistent with lab experiments: traders are willing to bear costs to punish deviators but are less likely to punish when counter-punishment is possible. Note: ***, **, * represents significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively. All numbers are saved up to four digits after the decimal point.
